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Colin Barnes 
 
This is something of an anniversary for me as it’s now 
exactly twenty-one years since I entered University as an 
undergraduate, at the tender age of 35, and just over ten 
years since the phrase ‘Disability Studies’ appeared in an 
academic context in the UK. This is because although 
people had been studying ‘disability’ related issues both 
within and without British universities and colleges since at 
least the 1960s, if not before, under various guises, the 
phrase had not been used until I adopted it in 1992 for two 
new courses offered in the Department of Sociology and 
Social Policy at the University of Leeds.  
 
These were a 20 credit module for second and third year 
undergraduates, entitled ‘Disability Studies: an 
introduction’, which started in October (1992) and a part 
time ‘Post Graduate Diploma/MA in Disability Studies’, 
open to graduates and people working in the disability 
field, that began operations one year later (1993).  
 
Unlike previous courses dealing with ‘disability’ related 
concerns in Britain and elsewhere, the focus was and 
remains clustered around the re-definition of disability by 
disabled people and their organisations and, what is 
generally referred to as the ‘social model of disability’. I’ll 
come to that in a minute.   
 
Hitherto ‘disability’ and related issues were covered at 
Leeds, as elsewhere, in a variety of courses within and 
without the areas of Sociology and Social Policy. An 
important example was ‘The Sociology of Health and 
Illness’.  
 
While the content of these courses had much to offer in 
terms of furthering our understanding of the experience of 
‘chronic illness’ and the ensuing economic and social 
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outcomes in terms of daily living for disabled people and 
their families, the central focus always seemed to be 
either on the physical and psychological consequences of 
the condition, or the complexity of the relationship 
between the disabled individual and their social 
environment.   
 
‘Disability’, usually defined as ‘functional limitation’, was 
caused by either: chronic illness/impairment or the 
complex interaction between the limitations of the body 
and/or mind, and society at large.    
  
The dominant ‘personal tragedy’ theory of disability was 
never seriously questioned and, with one or two notable 
exceptions, meaningful explanations for society’s 
responses to, and treatment of, people with impairments, 
whether real or ascribed, and ‘labelled’ disabled, were 
conspicuous by their absence (see for example, Bury, 
1982, Anderson and Bury, 1989).  
 
Key texts written by disabled academics and writers that 
provided a radical alternative to these conventions were, 
either, discussed only in passing and subsequently 
dismissed, or not mentioned at all.  
 
In other words the profoundly disabling tendencies of 
modern society were downplayed and or over looked 
completely. The policy outcomes of these approaches 
allowed politicians, professionals and practitioners; either, 
to adopt an exclusively traditional individual approach to 
the problem of ‘disability’ or, to espouse a more liberal 
inter-relational agenda similar to what Miller and Gwynne 
termed an ‘enlightened guardianship’ perspective way 
back in 1972. Thus, allowing them to vacillate between 
individual and collective solutions to the ‘disability’ issue. 
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And, despite the on-going rhetoric to the contrary, in 
market led or capitalist economies they invariably gravitate 
toward the former. For recent examples of these ‘all 
encompassing’ policy formulations in practice with 
reference to disabled people and paid work see 
Roulstone, (2000), for the British experience, and the 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) Report ‘Transforming Disability Into Ability: 
Policies to Promote Work and Income Security for 
Disabled People’ (OECD, 2003), for a cross cultural 
account.  
 
As someone with a lifetime’s experience of ‘disability’ who 
came to academia with the sole purpose of doing 
something on the discrimination experienced by disabled 
people this was both surprising and unacceptable.  
 
It was especially so since as a student and researcher, 
working with and for disabled people and their 
organisations, I had come across a whole body of work 
produced by disabled activists and writers that identified 
‘disability’ as a complex and pernicious form of social 
oppression or institutional discrimination that pervades 
every aspect of modern living.  
 
Key influences included the re-definition of disability by 
UPIAS, the social model of disability, and various 
theoretical explanations for the social creation of the 
concept ‘disability’.  
  
In contrast to previous definitions UPIAS had re-defined 
‘disability’ as something imposed on top of people with 
‘impairment’s’ lives, by a society that is intolerant of any 
form of biological flaw whether real or imagined (UPIAS, 
1976).  
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In order to put this idea to practical use, Mike Oliver 
coined the phrase the ‘social model of disability’ in 1981. It 
was used initially for the training of social workers and 
professionals working in the disability field (Oliver, 2003) 
and, later, as the main mechanism for delivering Disability 
Equality Training (Gillespie Sells and Campbell, 1990: 
Rieser and Mason, 1990) as opposed to ‘Disability 
Awareness Training which was usually constructed 
around traditional individualistic impairment specific 
considerations and concerns.   .  
 
It is important to remember here what the social model 
actually is. A model is what social scientists call a 
‘heuristic device’ or an aid to understanding. Thus:  
 
‘A good model can enable us to see something which 
we do not understand because in the model it can be 
seen from different viewpoints… it is this multi-
dimensioned replica of reality that can trigger insights 
that we might not otherwise develop’ (Finkelstein, 
2002: 13). 
 
Now, there are three main points that have been made 
repeatedly about the social model of disability.  
 
• One, in contrast to the conventional individual 
medical model of disability, it is a deliberate attempt 
to switch the focus away from the functional 
limitations of impaired individuals onto the problems 
caused by disabling environments, barriers and 
cultures.  
 
• Two, it is an holistic approach that explains specific 
problems experienced by disabled people in terms of 
the totality of disabling environments and cultures. 
This includes inaccessible education, information and 
communication systems, working environments, 
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inadequate disability benefits, discriminatory health 
and social support services, inaccessible transport, 
houses and public buildings and amenities, and the 
devaluing of disabled people through negative 
images in the media – films, television and 
newspapers.  
 
• Three, a social model perspective does not deny the 
importance or value of appropriate individually based 
interventions in the lives of disabled people, whether 
they be medically, re/habilitative, educational or 
employment based, but draws attention to their 
limitations in terms of furthering their empowerment 
and inclusion in a society constructed by ‘non-
disabled people’ for ‘non-disabled’ people.    
 
In short, the social model of disability is a tool with which 
to gain an insight into the disabling tendencies of modern 
society in order to generate policies and practices to 
facilitate their eradication. 
 
Subsequently, the phrase ‘the social model of disability’ 
has been used with reference to various theories 
explaining the social creation/construction of disability, but 
is generally linked to the materialist accounts of 
Finkelstein, (1980) Abberley (1987) Oliver (1990), and, 
more recently, Gleeson, (1999) and Thomas (1999) (see 
Priestley, 1998).  .  
 
Taken together these ideas underpinned the thinking 
behind the choice of the phrase ‘Disability Studies; which, 
for me is about the study of the various forces; economic, 
political, and cultural, that support and sustain ‘disability’, 
as defined by the disabled peoples movement, in order to 
generate meaningful and practical knowledge with which 
to further its eradication.  
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This is not to suggest that work that does not adhere to a 
social model perspective should be excluded from a 
disability studies agenda: far from it, to appreciate fully the 
significance of social model thinking it is necessary to 
have some knowledge of what has gone before. 
 
Now, as we all know since 1992 there has been a 
considerable upsurge of academic interest from a variety 
of disciplines, both in the UK and overseas, not all of 
which goes by the name of ‘disability studies’, but the term 
is now firmly established on the academic agenda 
encompassing both teaching and research. And much 
welcome progress has been made too.  
 
However, and perhaps inevitably with this heightened 
interest, several challenges have emerged that, in some 
ways, threaten to undermine a disability studies 
perspective, as defined above, or, more specifically, the 
social model of disability upon which it rests.    
 
Several of these criticisms are regularly repeated within 
and without the disability studies literature (see for 
example Shakespeare and Watson, 2002) without a 
qualified response. Since I believe this is a very worrying 
state of affairs I want to take this opportunity to address 
some of them here.  
 
First: it is argued that the conceptual division 
between impairment and disability upon which 
the social model rests is false (Shakespeare and 
Watson 2002).   
 
Now the UPIAS redefinition of impairment and disability 
was a deliberate attempt to separate the biological and the 
social. To suggest that such a distinction is false is like 
suggesting that the distinction between the individual and 
society is false.  
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Whilst such assertions may be of interest to philosophers 
and some social theorists, I believe that they have little, if 
any, practical value in terms of research, policy and 
practice.   
 
This is not to say that the term ‘impairment’ is not 
problematic since it is generally understood to refer to 
damaged or weakened bodies. It may be relevant when 
used in relation to someone’s reduced capabilities as a 
result of accident or illness, but is less so with reference to 
congenital conditions and those that do not affect people’s 
capacity to do things. Those of us born with impairment 
only usually realise we are somehow ‘different’ when we 
come into contact with other ‘non-disabled’ people.   
 
But it is important to remember here that although 
originally limited to physical impairments, shortly after its 
development, the UPIAS definition was adapted and 
adopted by the disabled people’s movement, both 
nationally and internationally, to include all ‘impairments’: 
physical, sensory, intellectual.  
 
Also integral to this re-assessment is the assertion that all 
physiological conditions have psychological implications 
and all psychological problems have physical 
consequences. It is therefore an inclusive concept that 
encompasses all sections of the disabled community 
including, for example, mental health systems users and 
survivors.   
 
This is in recognition of the fact that labels are generally 
imposed rather than chosen, and, therefore, socially and 
politically divisive. It also encompasses, implicitly if not 
explicitly, the notion that like ‘disability’ the meaning of 
‘impairment’ is a social construct too. Indeed, a key 
feature of ‘social model’ literature is that ‘attitudes’ toward 
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disabled people are historically, culturally and situationally 
determined.  
 
Several writers from both sides of the Atlantic have 
subsequently centred on the cultural production of 
‘normality/normalcy’ and the consequential interpretations 
of, and responses to ‘impairment’ (see for example, 
Finkelstein, 1980; Abberley, 1987: 1993: Davis, L. 
J.1996).  
 
Second: it is argued that the social model of 
disability neglects the everyday experience of 
‘impairment’ and that as a result a major part of 
disabled people’s lives is ignored and, 
consequentially, the ‘disabled lobby’ has 
sometimes opposed medical and rehabilitative 
interventions designed to ‘maximise function’ 
(Shakespeare and Watson 2002).   
 
With reference to the experience of ‘impairment’, as 
already mentioned social scientists and medical 
sociologists, in particular, have been documenting the 
everyday ‘illness’ experiences of disabled individuals for 
much of the last century.  
 
As long ago as 1966 the disabled activist and writer Paul 
Hunt pointed out that much of the writing about ‘disability’ 
by people with accredited impairments ‘is either 
sentimental biography, or else preoccupied with the 
medical and practical details of a particular affliction’ (ix). 
 
Advocates of the inclusion of such experiences in 
discussions about the exclusion of disabled people have 
yet to demonstrate how they would avoid such pitfalls, and 
equally importantly, those associated with the social 
science literature discussed earlier. 
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It is useful to remember too that the social model emerged 
from within the disabled people’s movement and that, from 
the outset, organisations of disabled people had 
recognised the need for disabled people to talk about their 
experiences. Indeed, the need for ‘peer counselling and 
support’ was one of the ‘seven needs’ for independent 
living identified by the Derbyshire Coalition of Disabled 
People (DCODP) in the early 1980s (Davis, K. 1990).  
 
Many of the user-controlled organisations that adhere to a 
social model perspective currently providing services for 
disabled people and their families in the UK, facilitate or 
support ‘impairment specific’ support groups (see, for 
example, Barnes, Mercer and Morgan, 2000).    
 
Furthermore, the conceptual distinction between 
impairment and disability does not ignore the fact that it 
may be a ‘personal tragedy’ to have an ‘impairment’, and 
that this may have implications for the way we do things.  
And in order to identify the various barriers disabled 
people face, some knowledge of their impairment related 
needs is essential.  
 
As a consequence, experiential or qualitative data have 
been used extensively in social model research 
advocating barrier removal, and/or the need for better 
services for disabled people (see for example Zarb and 
Nadash, 1995).    .  
 
Further, a social model perspective does not preclude the 
analysis of disabled people’s accounts of interpersonal 
barriers within the context of personal and family 
relationships. Nor does it exclude discussion of the 
psycho-emotional consequences of being perceived as 
‘impaired’, abnormal and or somehow less than human, by 
the rest of society: what disabled writers have sometimes 
referred to as ‘internal oppression’ (Rieser, 1990).  
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It would however warrant that these discussions be 
grounded firmly within a social model framework in order 
to avoid misinterpretation and misuse. Indeed, Donna 
Reeve (2003) and Carol Thomas (2003) are currently 
conducting important work along these lines at this 
University.  
 
With regard to the opposition to medical and rehabilitation 
interventions, as mentioned above the social model is not 
opposed to appropriate medical treatments and 
interventions.  
 
But advocates along with disabled people and their 
organisations have rightly drawn attention to the 
psychologically debilitating consequences for disabled 
individuals, that result from unrealistic and raised 
expectations following the promise of miraculous 
treatments and cures by medical and rehabilitation 
professionals and the media.  
 
A well-known example is that of Philip Olds; an ex-
policeman with an acquired spinal cord injury who died in 
the 1980s. After a lengthy period of ‘rehabilitation’, Olds 
committed suicide once he realised that a ‘revolutionary’ 
new technique to enable him to walk would not work, and 
so return him to his former ‘non-disabled’ status.  
 
Furthermore, the ‘disability’ lobby and, indeed, many other 
sections of society including social scientists, some 
medical professionals, various voluntary agencies not 
associated with disability, as well as large elements of the 
lay public, are justifiably sceptical about the supposed 
benefits of certain medical and re/habilitative 
interventions.  
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For instance, long standing concerns have rightly been 
voiced over the effectiveness or otherwise of various drug 
therapies and electric shock treatments for ‘mental health 
systems users and survivors’ by many people and groups 
not generally associated with the social model or 
‘disability’ organisations.  
 
More recent concerns revolve around developments in 
genetic medicine and MMR vaccines and autism,   
 
Given that such interventions have particular significance 
for disabled people and that these and similar concerns 
are widespread throughout the social sciences and society 
at large, I think it is perfectly understandable that disabled 
people and their organisations have reservations about 
their use.   
 
Third: it is often said that barrier removal will not 
solve all the problems associated with ‘disability’ 
as some of the problems encountered by 
disabled people are caused by impairment and 
not by society (Shakespeare and Watson 2002).   
. 
 
Again it is important to remember here that within a social 
model framework there is a conceptual distinction 
between the biological and the social, and that advocates 
have never claimed that barrier removal will eliminate all 
the problems associated with ‘impairment’.  
 
However, there is a wealth of literature from a variety of 
sources showing that how people deal with physiologically 
debilitating conditions is not only about the nature of the 
condition itself, but also about their access to resources: 
medical, material and social. 
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A social model analysis is not simply about the 
identification and removal of the barriers to economic and 
social activity, it also about identifying and removing the 
barriers that prevent access to such resources.  
 
Whilst access to better resources may not eliminate all the 
problems associated with physiologically based 
‘impairments’ it would certainly make a difference as to 
how people are empowered to cope with them.  
 
Additionally, a social model outlook is about the removal 
of cultural barriers and the struggle for a cultural 
environment free from prejudice, stigma and the 
discrimination associated with ‘impairment’ or ‘difference’.  
 
Surely in such a context the psycho-emotional implications 
currently linked to living with ‘impairment’ and a 
conventional ‘disabled’ (devalued/dependent) identity 
would be greatly reduced if not eliminated altogether? 
 
Fourth, it is claimed that the social model of 
disability is inadequate because many people 
with accredited impairments do not choose to 
adopt the label ‘disabled’ as they do not consider 
themselves ill enough, or because the concept is 
too limited to encompass the complexity of 
identity in the twenty first century (Shakespeare 
and Watson 2002).   
.  
 
Well I’m sure that this news will be welcomed by Gordon 
Brown, the treasury and all the other welfare agencies, 
including the OECD, around the world concerned about 
the escalating costs of disability benefits?. 
 
On a more serious note, this is hardly surprising given that 
in an increasingly competitive and unequal society the 
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label ‘disabled’ is still widely associated with abnormality, 
social and psychological inadequacy and incompetence, 
and that, in one way or another, all of us are socialised 
into the view that to admit to such things is a sign of 
weakness and failure.  
 
To be ‘ill’ is far more socially acceptable than it is being 
‘disabled’.  
 
But as I pointed out earlier, labels are generally imposed 
and rarely chosen. Surely whether people with accredited 
impairments choose to identify as ‘disabled’ is not the 
issue, what is at stake is how people are perceived and 
treated by society at large.  
 
Moreover, given the various deprivations generally 
associated with disability it is a miracle that anyone would 
want to adopt the label. The fact that they do can only be 
attributed to the politicisation of disability by disabled 
people and their organisations: alas, I don’t have the 
space to deal with that here.   .        
 
But there is another inference implicit in this claim and that 
is that the concept ‘disabled’ cannot accommodate other 
social indicators such as age, class, sexual preference, 
gender and ethnicity and so on, that shape our identity 
and, therefore, that social model thinking and disability 
politics are somehow inadequate.  
 
Now it’s important to remember here that throughout 
recorded history all forms of inequality, injustice and 
oppression have been sanctioned in one way or another 
on the basis of assumptions of biological inferiority.  
 
And that social model advocates have often pointed out 
that the politics of disablement is about far more than 
disabled people, it is about challenging oppression in all 
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its forms as ‘Impairment’ is not something that is peculiar 
to a small section of the population; it is fundamental to 
the human experience.  
 
But ‘disability’ as defined by the disabled people’s 
movement, is not. Like racism sexism and all other forms 
of social oppression it is a human creation and that. 
 
 ‘It is therefore impossible to confront one form of 
oppression without confronting them all’ (Barnes, 
1996: xii).        
              
And, finally, it has been claimed that the social 
model of disability is no longer relevant as it has 
had little real impact beyond the UK 
(Shakespeare and Watson 2002).   
 
As mentioned above, the UPIAS re-definition of ‘disability’ 
was adopted by the international disabled people’s 
movement, as represented by Disabled People’s 
International, in 1981; albeit the terms ‘disability’ and 
‘handicap’ were initially substituted for the words 
‘impairment’ and ‘disability’ because of concern over the 
term ‘impairment’ amongst some DPI delegates. However, 
DPI Europe subsequently reversed this substitution 
because of concern over the term ‘handicap’.  
 
The issue here is not necessarily the terms used but the 
meanings to which they are attached; in particular, the 
redefinition of disability/handicap as social oppression, 
and the adoption of a ‘social model’ or social/political 
analysis of its origins, continuity and abolition.      
   
DPI’s influence at the international level, particularly, 
within the UN is indisputable. A social model perspective 
is implicit if not explicit in various UN documents. The UN 
(1993) ‘Standard Rules on the Equalisation of 
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Opportunities for People with Disabilities’ is but one 
example.   
 
A social model perspective played a key role in the recent 
‘Rethinking Care from Disabled People’s Perspectives’ 
sponsored by the WHO’s Disability and Rehabilitation 
Team; a two year project and conference that involved 
professionals, disabled people, and their families from all 
over the world (WHO, 2001).  
 
In terms of European Policy, in a recent study entitled  
‘Disability Policies in European Countries’ (2001) Vim van 
Ooscrhot and Bjorn Hvinden stated: 
 
‘(T)he thinking about disability associated with the 
‘Social Model (of disability) appears to have become 
more widely accepted’ (Oorshot and Hvinden, 2001: 
9).  
 
At the academic level the conceptual distinction between 
the biological and the social and a social model outlook is 
now evident in much of the writing on disability in other 
parts of the world. See, for example, in Australia, Gleeson, 
1999: Canada, Rioux and Bach, 1994: Michalko, 2002: 
Titchkosky, 2003: and, the USA, Davis, L. J. 2000: Linton, 
1998.  
 
To summarise, the key issue here is that the re-
conceptualisation of disability, the social model, and social 
model theorising, have played a crucial role in the 
development of a disability studies agenda in terms of 
clarity, meaning and purpose.  
 
Yet although substantive progress has been made, much 
of the last decade seems to have been spent going over 
well-trodden ground, without due rigour and qualification 
(see for example Shakespeare and Watson 2002: and 
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more recently Shakespeare, 2006). This for me has been 
a major disappointment as it has in many ways stifled 
further and meaningful development of the disability 
studies agenda. .  
 
This is not to suggest that the principles upon which 
disability studies, as defined above, are based should not 
be subject to scrutiny or constant re-evaluation; on the 
contrary, in my view, they can and will only benefit from 
such examination.   
 
But surely, the point is to build on what’s gone before 
rather than simply tear it down without having anything of 
substance with which to replace it. If this is not what 
disability studies is all about then in my view its future is 
limited and justifiably so.          
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